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Summary 
This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows agents to 
enter bilateral alliances and to extract payoffs from enemies. Each pair of agents creates a 
surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies, then the agent with 
more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash equilibria are of two 
types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second, asymmetric equilibria, such 
that agents can be partitioned into sets of different size, where agents within the same set 
are allies and agents in different sets are enemies. These results stand in contrast to coalition 
formation games in the economics of conflict literature, where stable group structures are 
generally symmetric. The model provides a game-theoretic foundation for structural balance, 
a long- standing notion in social psychology, which has been fruitfully applied to the study 
of alliance formation in international relations. 
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This paper presents a game-theoretic model of network formation, which allows
agents to enter bilateral alliances and to extract payo⁄s from enemies. Each pair of
agents creates a surplus of one, which allies divide in equal parts. If agents are enemies,
then the agent with more allies obtains a larger share of the surplus. I show that Nash
equilibria are of two types. First, a state of utopia, where all agents are allies. Second,
asymmetric equilibria, such that agents can be partitioned into sets of di⁄erent size,
where agents within the same set are allies and agents in di⁄erent sets are enemies.
These results stand in contrast to coalition formation games in the economics of con￿ ict
literature, where stable group structures are generally symmetric.
The model provides a game-theoretic foundation for structural balance, a long-
standing notion in social psychology, which has been fruitfully applied to the study of
alliance formation in international relations.
Key Words: Network formation, economics of con￿ ict, contest success function,
structural balance, international relations.
1 Introduction
In much of the literature on networks, links carry a positive connotation and are com-
monly interpreted as friendship, collaboration or transmission of information. In many con-
texts, however, links may also be associated with antagonism, coercion or even outright
￿I am greatful to my supervisors Fernando Vega-Redondo and Massimo Morelli for their invaluable sup-
port and guidance. I also thank Matthew O. Jackson, Paolo Pin, Francesco Squintani, participants of the
Networks Working Group at the European University Institute, seminar participants at PUC-Rio and par-
ticipants of the UECE Lisbon Meetings 2010 for helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine. Contact:
timo.hiller@eui.eu, Address: Department of Economics, European University Institute, Via della Piazzuola
43, 50133 Florence, Italy
1con￿ ict. This paper aims at clarifying the interplay between these two forces by way of a
game-theoretic model of network formation. The approach is closely related to the notion
of structural balance - an intuitive, yet entirely ad-hoc concept in the social psychology lit-
erature, which originated in a seminal contribution by Heider (1946) and continues to be an
active ￿eld of study until today.
The advantage of the game-theoretic formulation is twofold. First, it shows how the
global network properties, as obtained by structural balance, can be derived in a setting
where self-interested individuals form their connections strategically. Second, it allows me
to address questions concerning relative size and maximum number of groups, which could
previously not be answered. Before proceeding, let me brie￿ y explain the main insights of
structural balance.
In its most basic form, structural balance assumes a complete network of positive and
negative links, with a positive link denoting alliance or friendship and a negative one denoting
antagonism or enmity. The essential idea is that positively connected nodes have a tendency
to match their attitudes relative to third nodes, in order to avoid "cognitive dissonance", or
psychological stress.
Balanced vs. Unbalanced Triads
i
j k
a) i, j, and k are mutual friends:
balanced
c) i is friends with j and k, but j
and k are enemies: unbalanced
b) i and j are friends with k as a
mutual enemy: balanced




















2A signed graph is said to be balanced, if for each triad, either all three links are positive,
or one is positive and two are negative. This leaves two triad con￿gurations, which are de￿ned
as unbalanced. First, two positive and one negative link. Second, the ambiguous case where
all three links are negative. The intuition for the ￿rst case - with two positive and one negative
link - to be considered unbalanced, is that the node with the two friendship links will either
have to choose sides among his friends due to aforementioned "cognitive dissonance", or
otherwise the two enemies will have to make peace. The second con￿guration, where all
links are negative, is considered unbalanced, because two of the nodes may have incentives
to ally and gang up on their common enemy. Cartwright and Harary (1956) showed that
these local properties yield sharp predictions globally. In particular, the only two network
con￿gurations, which are balanced are such that either all nodes are friends, or there exist
two distinct sets, also called cliques, where nodes in the same set are friends and nodes in
di⁄erent sets sustain antagonistic relationships.1
Arguably, the incentives of two nodes to gang up on a common enemy are signi￿cantly
lower than those of a node having to choose sides among two of his friends. This view has
led to the de￿nition of weak structural balance, which assumes triads with only antagonistic
relationships among themselves to be balanced (Davis (1967)). A signed graph is weakly
balanced, if (and only if) nodes can be divided into distinct sets, such that any two nodes
in the same set are friends, while any two nodes in di⁄erent sets are enemies. In terms of its
characterization, the di⁄erence between weak structural balance and structural balance in its
stronger form, is that weak structural balance allows for more than two antagonistic groups.
Put succinctly, while under structural balance "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" must
hold, weak structural balance postulates the weaker condition that "the friend of my enemy
is my enemy".
I develop a model of strategic network formation, which picks up on the insights ob-
tained from structural balance and accounts for the interplay between friendship or alliances
on the one hand and antagonism or enmity on the other. The setup is simple. Each pair
of connected agents creates a unit surplus, which may be interpreted as a trade of money,
goods, and services.2 Agents can either extend friendly or antagonistic links, at zero cost. A
mutual friendly link creates a friendship or alliance and the surplus is shared in equal parts.
1I provide a sketch of the proof. A graph with only positive links is balanced. For a graph with positive
and negative links, pick an aribitrary node i and devide the remaining set of nodes into i￿ s friends and i￿ s
enemies. All of i￿ s friends must be friends, as otherwise one obtains an unbalanced triad with two positive
and one negative link. All of i￿ s enemies must be friends, as otherwise one obtains an unbalanced triads
with three negative links. Then, links between i￿ s friends and i￿ s enemies must be negative, as otherwise one
obtains an unbalanced triad with two negative and one positive link.
2More generally, exchange can be thought of as a general characteristic of social interaction, which is -
by and large - based on reciprocation.
3If one node extends a friendly link, while the other extends an antagonistic one, then the
two nodes enter a coercive relationship and the unit surplus is divided according to a general
contest success function. The contest success function is assumed to be strictly increasing
in the ratio of a node￿ s respective number of allies. Therefore, under a coercive link, nodes
with more allies extract payo⁄s in excess of one half from nodes with fewer allies. A mutual
antagonistic link translates into a con￿ ictive relationship and the surplus is lost. However,
the last assumption is not crucial. In fact, any arbitrarily small amount of cost of con￿ ict
and a split of the remaining surplus, as implied by the con￿ ict success function, is su¢ cient
for my results to go through. One can then think of the payo⁄s resulting from a coercive
link as settlement in the shadow of con￿ ict.
The characterization of Nash equilibria mirrors the structural properties obtained in
the social psychology literature. Equilibrium con￿gurations are such that, either all nodes
are friends, or nodes can be divided into distinct sets of di⁄erent size, where nodes within the
same set are friends and nodes in di⁄erent sets sustain coercive relationships. Asymmetry of
equilibria is one of the most salient features of the model and at the same time constitutes
a departure from previous work on structural balance. Outright con￿ ict is never part of
an equilibrium, as payo⁄s under coercion are always positive and either con￿ ict party can
pro￿tably deviate by extending a positive link instead.
The range of sustainable equilibrium con￿gurations will depend on the shape of the
contest success function, which de￿nes the available coercion or war technology - parame-
trized by ￿. Under a coercive relationship, a low value of ￿ is favorable for the node with
fewer friends (the potential defender), while a high value of ￿ bene￿ts the node with the
higher number of friends (the potential aggressor). Preliminary results, not yet included
in this version of the paper, indicate that, if ￿ is su¢ ciently high, then multiple groups of
di⁄erent size can be sustained in equilibrium. The model predictions therefore coincide with
weak structural balance. Furthermore, low values of ￿ - a relative advantage for the defender
- force the equilibrium into weakly more asymmetric structures.


















































Structural balance theory has become an e⁄ective tool for the analysis of alliance for-
mation among states. One of the earliest applications is Harary (1961), who examines the
rapid shifts of relationships among nations concerning the Middle Eastern situation in 1956
and observes a strong tendency towards balance. Moore (1979) also employs structural bal-
ance when explaining the "United States￿ s somewhat surprising support of Pakistan ..." after
Bangladesh￿ s separation in 1972. Another, particularly interesting example is provided by
Antal, Krapivsky and Redner (2006), who link the formation of alliances in the 19th century
- ultimately leading up to WWI - to structural balance. The accompanying graph is depicted
above, where alliances are denoted by straight black lines and antagonistic relationships by
dashed red lines. Note how the network gradually moves towards a structurally balanced
state. A point to be made here is that, although balance appears to be a natural outcome,
its implications need not be positive.
Interaction patterns of individuals have, of course, also been examined for structural
balance properties. Szell, Lambiotte and Thurner (2010) analyze a vast data-set from a
multiplayer online game called Pardus, encompassing more than 300.000 players. The game
allows for six types of interactions, of which some have a positive (friendship, communica-
tion, trade) and others have a negative association (hostility, aggression, punishment). The
authors ￿nd strong support for structural balance, favoring its weak speci￿cation. Further-
5more, positive links display far higher clustering than negative ones and positive links are
highly reciprocal, while negative links are not. This is much in line with the results obtained
in this paper. Recent research in sociology has examined the evolution of signed network
relations. Doreian and Mrvar (1996) and Doreian and Krackhardt (2001) are two such empir-
ical studies. In both cases a perfectly balanced state is not found, but a movement towards
balance is evident.
This paper relates to a strand of the economics literature, which allows for appropria-
tion and con￿ ict, recognizing that property rights may not always be perfectly and costlessly
enforced. Con￿ ict is modelled in terms of a contest success function (Tullock (1967, 1980))
and Hirshleifer (1989)), where an agent￿ s probability of winning is a function of the resources
available for arming. Open con￿ ict, however, does not have to take place, and may instead
be used as an instrument for bargaining. Part of this research focuses on coalition and group
formation among states in the context of distributional con￿ ict (W￿rneryd (1998) and Este-
ban and SÆkovics (2003)). Group structures are, based on the notion of farsighted stability3
(Chwe (1994)), shown to be symmetric. Jordan (1996) considers coalitional games, where
coalitions with more wealth can pillage the wealth of poorer coalitions at no cost. The far-
sighted core allocations are again symmetric. These ￿ndings are in sharp contrast to the
results obtained here.
My paper also contributes to the theory of network formation, which has been an
active area of research in recent years. See for example Aumann and Myerson (1988), Bala
and Goyal (2000) and Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The so called co-author model in
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Chwe (2003) obtain similar results in terms of equilibrium
structures. Two recent papers, which also feature con￿ ict success functions in a network
setting are Goyal and Virgier (2010) and Franke and ￿zt￿rk (2009), both with a di⁄erent
focus from mine. Goyal and Virgier (2010) consider a design problem and ask how to
optimally structure networks, so that they are robust to attacks in the face of an adversary.
Franke and ￿zt￿rk (2009), in turn, model a setting where agents are embedded in a network
of bilateral con￿ icts. The authors are concerned with con￿ ict intensity on a ￿xed network
and considerations of link and alliance formation are entirely absent. To the best of my
knowledge, the model presented here is the ￿rst to incorporate friendship (or alliance) and
antagonism (or coercion) in a network formation context.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model, Section 3 provides an intuitive account of the main results and Section 4 concludes.
All formal proofs are con￿ned to the Appendix.
3Under farsighted stability agents consider the ultimate outcome of a potential deviation.
62 A Simple Model of Friends and Enemies
Let N = (1;2;:::;n) be the set of ex-ante identical agents, with n ￿ 3. A strategy for
i 2 N is de￿ned as a row vector gi = (gi;1;gi;2;:::;gi;i￿1;gi;i+1;:::;gi;n); where gi;j 2 f￿1;1g
for each j 2 Nnfig: i is said to extend a positive or friendly link to j if gi;j = 1 and a
negative or coercive link if gi;j = ￿1. The set of strategies of agent i is de￿ned by Gi and
the strategy space by G = G1￿:::￿Gn. The resulting network of relationships is written as
g = (g1;g2;:::;gn): De￿ne the undirected network ￿ g in the following way. The link between
node i and j in the undirected network is positive, if both directed links are positive, so that
￿ gi;j = 1 if gi;j = gj;i = 1: The link in the undirected network is negative, if one of the two
directed links is positive, while the other is negative, so that ￿ gi;j = ￿1 if gi;j ￿ gj;i = ￿1. If
both nodes extend a negative link to each other, then no link is established in the undirected
network, so that ￿ gi;j = 0 if gi;j = gj;i = ￿1. Given a network g, g + g
+
i;j and g + g
￿
ij have
the following interpretation. When gi;j = ￿1 in g, g + g
+
i;j changes the link gi;j = ￿1 into
gi;j = 1, while if gi;j = 1 in g, then g + g
+
i;j = g: Similarly, if gi;j = 1 in g, g + g
￿
i;j changes
the link gi;j = 1 into gi;j = ￿1, while if gi;j = ￿1 in g, then g + g
￿
i;j = g:
De￿ne the following sets: N
+
i (￿ g) = fk 2 N j gi;k = 1 ^ gk;i = 1g is the set of nodes to
which node i has a positive link in the undirected network ￿ g: N
￿
i (￿ g) = fk 2 N j gi;k ￿ gk;i = ￿1g
is the set of nodes to which node i has a negative link in the undirected network ￿ g, while
N0
i (￿ g) = fk 2 N j gi;k = ￿1 ^ gk;i = ￿1g is the set of nodes to which node i has no link in
the undirected network ￿ g. The corresponding cardinalities are denoted by ￿
+
i (￿ g) =j N
+
i (￿ g) j;
￿
￿
i (￿ g) =j N
￿
i (￿ g) j and ￿0
i(￿ g) =j N0
i (￿ g) j : Call Pk(￿ g) = fi 2 N j ￿
+
i (￿ g) = kg the set of nodes
with k positive links in the undirected network ￿ g.
The payo⁄ function ￿i = G ! R













with ￿ > 0: Links in the undirected network are interpreted in the following way. ￿ gi;j = 1
is created by a reciprocated positive link and establishes an alliance or friendship between i
and j: The surplus of one is shared in equal parts. ￿ gi;j = ￿1 stems from one friendly and one
coercive link and denotes a coercive relationship. Under a coercive link, a node with more
allies can extract payo⁄s in excess of 1
2 from a node with fewer allies. The exact extraction
value is determined by a general contest success function, explained in more detail below.
￿ gi;j = 0 results from a mutual coercive link and can be thought of a link of con￿ ict, where
no exchange occurs and surplus is lost.
7I assume that the coercive strength of node i is determined by ￿
+
i (￿ g) + 1. In the
presence of a coercive link, the relative shares of the surplus of one - denoted here by pi and
pj - are determined by the ratio of i and j￿ s coercive strength. The contest success function







i (￿ g) + 1
￿
+
j (￿ g) + 1
!￿
:




i (￿ g) + 1)￿
(￿
+
i (￿ g) + 1)￿ + (￿
+
j (￿ g) + 1)￿;
which corresponds to the second term in the payo⁄ function ￿i. Note that the contest
success function is concave for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 and s-shaped for ￿ > 1; with an in￿ ection point at
￿
+
i (￿ g) = ￿
+
j (￿ g).
De￿nition 1: A clique is a set of nodes Ck(￿ g) ￿ N such that ￿ gi;j = 1 8i;j 2 Ck(￿ g): Call a
clique maximal and denote with Cm
k (￿ g), if for any l 2 N ^ l = 2 Cm
k (￿ g), Cm
k (￿ g) [ flg is not a
clique.








￿i);8gi 2 Gi;8i 2 N:
Throughout the paper, the network after a proposed deviation is denoted with ￿ g￿0.
There is one remark I would like to make concerning the assumption that surplus is
shared in equal parts under a friendly link. One may object that this split is arbitrary and
an alternative model speci￿cation could, for example, allow for two di⁄erent values of ￿: ￿f
for the division of surplus under a friendly link and ￿c for the division of surplus under a
coercive link. Preliminary results indicate that making the sensible assumption that ￿c > ￿f,
thereby allocating a greater portion of the shared surplus to a friend (as compared to an
enemy), is su¢ cient for all my results to hold.
83 The Friend of My Enemy is My Enemy
The aim of the analysis is to obtain a full characterization of Nash equilibria. This sec-
tion provides fairly detailed sketches of the proofs, while the formal arguments are relegated
to the Appendix. In Lemma 1 I ￿rst show that outright con￿ ict is never an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 then proves that in a coercive relationship, it must always be the node with the
higher number of friends extending the negative link. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 pro-
vide existence for my main result in Proposition 3: Nash equilibria are characterized by either
a state of utopia, where all nodes are friends, or the undirected network can be partitioned
into sets of nodes of di⁄erent size, where nodes in the same set are friends and nodes in
di⁄erent sets sustain coercive relationships. Lemma 3 shows that in any Nash equilibrium,
nodes with the same number of friends will also be friends with each other. This observation
drives most of the results.
Lemma 1: In any NE g￿, @￿ gi;j = 0 for some i;j 2 N:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that a con￿ ict link can never be part of a Nash equilibrium. The reason
for this is that both nodes involved in the link have an incentive to deviate. By extending a
friendly link, both nodes obtain a positive payo⁄, compared to a payo⁄of zero under con￿ ict,
while payo⁄s from links to all other nodes remain the same (the deviation does not alter the
total number of friends).
Lemma 2: In any NE ￿ g￿; if 9i;j 2 N : ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1 with ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) < ￿
+
j (￿ g￿) then g￿
i;j = 1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Lemma 2 I prove that in equilibrium, for all competitive links in place in the undi-
rected network, it must be the node with more friends extending the directed antagonistic
link. This is easy to see, as otherwise the node with fewer friends can pro￿tably deviate
by reciprocating the friendly link, thereby increasing his payo⁄ from this speci￿c link to 1
2:
Moreover, he will increase payo⁄s on all his coercive links, while all friendly links continue
to yield him a payo⁄ of 1
2.
9Proposition 1: 8￿ > 0 9NE g￿ : ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 8i;j 2 N:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that a state of utopia, where everyone is friends with everyone, is
a Nash equilibrium for any value of ￿. The intuition for this is that no node can unilaterally
extract additional payo⁄s from nodes, who have the same number of friends prior to a
potential deviation.
Proposition 2: 8￿ > 0 9NE ￿ g￿ : 9k : ￿ g￿
i;k = ￿1 8i 2 Nnfkg ^ ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 8i;j 2 Nnfkg:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 provides an existence result for Proposition 3 and states that all nodes
being friends with each other, except for one (who in turn is enemies with all remaining
nodes), is a Nash equilibrium for any value of ￿.4 Call the node without friends node k.
There are then at least two other nodes, which I call i and j, who are friends with each other.
From Lemma 2 I know that any con￿guration where k extends competitive links, while any of
the remaining nodes extend friendly ones, can not be a Nash equilibrium. Assume therefore
that k extends friendly links to all other nodes. A deviation for node k then consists of
substituting a subset of these friendly links for competitive ones. This, however, is not
pro￿table, as k then receives a payo⁄ of zero on the resulting con￿ ict links, while payo⁄s
from links to all other nodes remain unchanged. For node i, there are three di⁄erent types
of deviations to be considered and I will show for each of them that no pro￿table deviation
exists. First, i will not ￿nd it pro￿table to extend a friendly link to k, as he will loose out on
his payo⁄s in excess of 1
2, due to ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) < ￿
+
i (￿ g￿): Second, i is not able to extract additional
payo⁄s by extending competitive links to any subset of Nnfi;kg, as then node i will have
weakly less friends than any node in Nnfi;kg. In fact, any such deviation will strictly
decrease i￿ s payo⁄s, as i will have less friends after the deviation and can therefore also
extract less from node k. Third, a combination of the above two, that is, reciprocating k￿ s
positive link and extending one or more negative link(s) to any of the remaining nodes. For
n = 3 it is easy to see that there does not exist a pro￿table deviation, as payo⁄s remain the
same. For n ￿ 4 payo⁄s will strictly decrease. I discern two cases. If the deviation involves
only one additional negative link, i￿ s payo⁄s decrease, as node k will have less friends prior
to the proposed deviation than j after it. If the deviation involves more than one additional
negative link, payo⁄s will be lower even further, because i can now not only extract less from
4In fact, for n ￿ 5, it can be shown that there always exists an equilibrium con￿guration where 2 nodes
consitute the smallest clique. This result is not yet incorporated in the current version of the paper.
10k, but he will also receive payo⁄s of less than 1
2 from all other nodes to which he extends
negative links.
Lemma 3: In any NE ￿ g￿, if ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
j (￿ g￿) =) ￿ g￿
i;j = 1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 states that, in any Nash equilibrium, nodes who have the same number of
friends are also friends with each other. I will use this result extensively for the characteriza-
tion of equilibrium. Note that Lemma 3 already rules out any con￿guration with cliques of
equal size as part of a Nash equilibrium. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there
are two nodes, i and j, such that they have the same number of friends, but sustain a coer-
cive relationship. Without loss of generality, assume that node i extends the negative link,
while node j extends the positive one. I discern 4 cases, which cover all possible networks,
each yielding a contradiction with my initial assumption. In the graphs below, black solid
lines signify positive, while dashed red lines stand for negative links. The number next to
the node indicates the number of friends of that node.










Case 1: The link between i and j is the only negative one in the undirected network,
all other links are positive. This can not be an equilibrium, as any node k can pro￿tably
deviate by extending a negative link to either i or j. Node k will then extort payo⁄s in excess
of one half from that particular link, while payo⁄s on all his other links remain unchanged.
Note that in a triad, this is analogous to saying that a con￿guration with two positive links
and one negative is not balanced.










Case 2: There are at least two competitive links in the undirected network and i and
j are only involved in the one between themselves (and have N ￿2 friends). There are then
two nodes, k and l, which are involved in at least one negative link. Therefore, k has at
most as many friends as i prior to the deviation and i can pro￿tably deviate by extending a
positive link to j and a negative one to k. i then extorts payo⁄s in excess of 1
2 from k, while
payo⁄s from all remaining links stay the same.










Case 3: Nodes i and j extend both, positive and negative links. i can then deviate
pro￿tably by extending a friendly link to j, as i will be able to extract higher payo⁄s from
each of his negative links, while payo⁄s from all positive links remain constant.










Case 4: All links in the undirected network are negative. Node i receives a payo⁄ of
(N ￿1)￿ 1
2 and can deviate pro￿tably by extending a positive link to j. He then continues to
receive a payo⁄ of 1
2 from his link with j, but receives a payo⁄ in excess of 1
2 from all other
nodes.
Proposition 3: Any NE ￿ g￿ s:t: 9s;t 2 N : ￿+
s (￿ g￿) 6= ￿
+
t (￿ g￿), ￿ g￿ can be partitioned into
maximal cliques of di⁄erent size with ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1; if i 2 Cm
k (￿ g￿) and j 2 Cm
l (￿ g￿):
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 provides a characterization of equilibrium. It states that, in any Nash
equilibrium, such that there are at least two nodes with di⁄erent numbers of friends, the
undirected network can be partitioned into maximal cliques of friends of di⁄erent size. Nodes
in larger cliques (with more friends), extend negative links to nodes in smaller cliques (with
fewer friends).
The proof for Proposition 3 is by induction. First, I rank the sets of nodes with the
same number of friends, Pk(￿ g￿), by their subscripts, where the subscript stands for the
number of friends of a node in that set. I call the set of nodes with the highest number of
friends P m(￿ g￿), the set with the second highest number of friends P m￿1(￿ g￿) and proceed in
this way until the set of nodes with the lowest number of friends. The idea of the proof is
to show that the cardinality j Pk(￿ g￿) j= k + 1, which - together with Lemma 3 - already
implies the result. Remember that by Lemma 2 all nodes, which are not in P m(￿ g￿), extend
positive links to all nodes in P m(￿ g￿). Therefore, the sign of a link in the undirected network
￿ g￿ is determined by the sign of the directed link, which the node with more friends extends
to the node with fewer friends.
13Base Case: In the base case, I prove in four steps that j P m
x (￿ g￿) j= x + 1.












Step 1: Here I show that in any Nash equilibrium g￿, any two nodes i;j 2 P m(￿ g￿)
must be linked to all other nodes in the same way. That is, all nodes to which i has a friendly
link in the undirected network ￿ g￿, j will have a friendly link as well, while all nodes to which
i has a antagonistic link in the undirected network ￿ g￿, j will likewise have a antagonistic
link. Assume the contrary. As i and j are both in P m(￿ g￿), i and j have the same number
of friends, ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
j (￿ g￿): But then, there must exist a pair of nodes, k and l, such that i
has a friendly link with k and an antagonistic one with l, while j has a friendly link with l
and an antagonistic one with k: Such a con￿guration is depicted in the graph above. Note
that k and l are not in P m(￿ g￿), as by Lemma 3 both, i and j, are linked positively to all
nodes in P m(￿ g￿): Furthermore, assume w.l.o.g. that l has at least as many friends as k.
This con￿guration can not be an equilibrium, as node i can pro￿tably deviate by creating a
friendly link with l and an antagonistic one with k. i￿ s number of friends remains the same,
while k has now strictly less friends than l had before the deviation, i.e. ￿
+
k (￿ g￿0) < ￿
+
l (￿ g￿).
Therefore, i can extract more from k than he was previously able to extract from l.
Step 2: I prove that any con￿guration, which is not of the following two types, can
not be a Nash equilibrium g￿. First, all nodes i 2 P m(￿ g￿) have positive links with all nodes
k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) in the undirected network ￿ g￿. Second, all nodes i 2 P m(￿ g￿) have negative
links with all nodes k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) in the undirected network ￿ g￿. I assume to the contrary
that there are positive and negative links between nodes in P m(￿ g￿) and P m￿1(￿ g￿) and discern
two cases.







First, there does not exist a set P m￿2(￿ g￿): I know from Step 1 that nodes in P m(￿ g￿)
are linked to all remaining nodes in the same way. Assume now, w.l.o.g., that k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿)
is linked positively with all i 2 P m(￿ g￿), while l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) is linked negatively with all
i 2 P m(￿ g￿) in the undirected network ￿ g￿. This can not be an equilibrium, as from Lemma 3
I know that all nodes in P m￿1(￿ g￿) are connected to each other in a positive way and therefore
node k has more friends than node l. But then k and l can not both be in P m￿1(￿ g￿).
























Second, there exists a set P m￿2(￿ g￿). Recall that any two nodes in P m(￿ g￿) are linked to
all remaining nodes in the same way. Assume again that k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) is linked positively
with all i 2 P m(￿ g￿), while l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) is linked negatively with all i 2 P m(￿ g￿) in the
15undirected network ￿ g￿. But then k is linked positively to all nodes in P m￿1(￿ g￿) and to all
nodes in P m(￿ g￿), while for all i 2 P m(￿ g￿) there exists a node l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿), for which the link
in the undirected network ￿ g￿ is negative. In order for i 2 P m(￿ g￿) to have more friends than
k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿), there must exist a node h 2 P m￿x(￿ g￿); with x ￿ 2, such that all i 2 P m(￿ g￿)
are linked positively to h 2 P m￿x(￿ g￿), while node k is linked negatively to h 2 P m￿x(￿ g￿) in
the undirected network ￿ g￿. But this can not be a Nash equilibrium, as then i can pro￿tably
deviate by extending a negative link to h 2 P m￿x(￿ g￿); with x ￿ 2; and a positive one to
l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿). This deviation is pro￿table, as h has less friends after the deviation than l
had prior to it.






















Step 3: I show that, if all nodes i 2 P m(￿ g￿) are linked positively to all k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿),
then it must be that the set of friends of node k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) are a strict subset of the friends
of node i 2 P m(￿ g￿). The underlying argument is very similar to what I already used in the
￿rst step.
First, note that there must exist a node h, which is neither in P m(￿ g￿), nor in P m￿1(￿ g￿),
such that h is connected positively with all i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and there exists some k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿),
such that h and k are connected negatively in the undirected network ￿ g￿. Otherwise k
would have at least as many friends as i, contradicting the assumption that i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and
k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿). Assume now that k￿ s friends are not a strict subset of i￿ s friends. Then
there must exist a node l, which is neither in P m(￿ g￿); nor in P m￿1(￿ g￿), such that l is linked
negatively with all i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and positively with some node k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿). This is depicted
in the graph above. I can discern two cases. First, h has at most as many friends as l, that
is, ￿
+
h(￿ g￿) ￿ ￿
+
l (￿ g￿). Then, i can deviate pro￿tably by extending a positive link to l and a
negative one to h - the deviation shown in the above graph. If l has at most as many friends
16as h, ￿
+
l (￿ g￿) ￿ ￿
+
h(￿ g￿), then node k can deviate pro￿tably by extending a friendly link to h
and a competitive one to l: Both cases yield a contradiction.
Step 4: I can now at last establish that, in any Nash equilibrium g￿, links between all
i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and all k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) must be negative in the undirected network ￿ g￿. Assume
the contrary. If there does not exist a set P m￿2(￿ g￿), it is easy to see that the statement
must hold, as otherwise i and k would have the same number of friends, i.e. ￿
+
i (￿ g) = ￿
+
k (￿ g),
yielding an immediate contradiction. For the case where there exists a set P m￿2(￿ g￿), I can
distinguish two cases.
First, payo⁄s of k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) are at least as high as payo⁄s of i 2 P m(￿ g￿) : ￿k(g￿) ￿
￿i(g￿). Recall from Step 3 that k￿ s friends are a subset of i￿ s friends and consider a deviation
where i imitates k￿ s strategy. Under the resulting undirected network after the deviation ￿ g￿0,
i and j are linked in the same way and i obtains higher payo⁄s in ￿ g￿0 than k did in ￿ g￿. To
see this, note that no enemy of k has more friends after the deviation and at least one has
fewer friends. Therefore, ￿i(g￿0) > ￿k(g￿) ￿ ￿i(g￿) and i can pro￿tably deviate.
Second, payo⁄s of i 2 P m(￿ g￿) are higher than payo⁄s of k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) : ￿i(g￿) >
￿k(g￿): Now k can pro￿tably deviate by imitating i￿ s strategy and payo⁄s of k after the
deviation are equal to i￿ s, i.e. ￿i(g￿) = ￿k(g￿0) > ￿k(g￿). Note that from Step 3 - that
k￿ s friends are a subset of i￿ s friends - I know that k imitating i￿ s strategy entails linking
positively to all nodes to which i is linked positively, while k is linked negatively in ￿ g￿. Then,
k and i are linked in the same way in the undirected network after the deviation ￿ g￿0, while
all nodes to which i extends antagonistic links have the same number of friends in ￿ g￿ and
￿ g￿0. Therefore, k￿ s payo⁄s after the deviation are equal to i￿ s payo⁄s prior to it, resulting in
a pro￿table deviation.
I have now shown that all links between all i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and all k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) must be
negative. But then, all links between all i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and all h 2 P m￿x(￿ g￿); for x ￿ 2; must
be negative as well. Assume the contrary. Then i could pro￿tably deviate by extending a
positive link to k and a negative one to h: As all nodes in i 2 P m
x (￿ g￿) (where the subscript
indicates the number of friends of a node in set P m
x (￿ g￿)) extend negative links to all other
nodes k = 2 P m
x (￿ g￿), it must be that j P m
x (￿ g￿) j= x + 1. This concludes the description of the
base case of the proof.
Inductive Step: For the inductive steps I de￿ne the set ~ P r(￿ g￿) = fP m(￿ g￿);P m￿1(￿ g￿);
:::;P m￿r(￿ g￿)g, which contains all nodes that have the r + 1 highest number of friends. The
base case showed that the statement of Propositions 2 holds for ~ P 0(￿ g￿) = P m(￿ g￿): In the
inductive step I assume that the statement holds for the set ~ P r(￿ g￿) and then show that it
must also hold for ~ P r+1(￿ g￿): Note ￿rst that, given the statement holds for ~ P r(￿ g￿), all nodes
q 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿) extend negative links to all nodes z = 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿). By Lemma 1 I know that in
17any Nash equilibrium g￿; all z = 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿) extend friendly links to q 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿): Assuming that
the statement holds for ~ P r(￿ g￿), I can then relabel P m(￿ g￿) with P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿) and P m￿1(￿ g￿)
with P m￿(r+2)(￿ g￿) and repeat the Steps 1 through 4 from the base case to establish that
all links between all h 2 P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿) and all z 2 P m￿(r+2)(￿ g￿) are negative and therefore
h 2 P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿) is linked negatively to all nodes w = 2 P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿): j P
m￿(r+1)
y (￿ g￿) j= y +1
and above statement holds for ~ P r+1(￿ g￿). This concludes the equilibrium characterization.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper I present a simple model of network formation, where agents enter into
positive (friendship or alliances) and negative (antagonism or coercion) relationships. The
coercive power of an agent, relative to another agent, is determined by the ratio of their
respective allies. That is to say, an agent with more allies may exploit another agent with
fewer allies under a coercive relationship. There are three main insights to be drawn.
First, the model shows how in this context self-interested behavior of agents yield the
following sharp structural predictions under Nash equilibrium. Either all nodes are friends, or
cliques of allies emerge, with antagonistic relationships among distinct cliques. This mirrors
results on signed networks obtained in the structural balance literature of social psychology.
Second, cliques are of di⁄erent size. This result is interesting, because it constitutes a
departure from structural balance, where balanced outcomes allow for cliques of same size. It
is also in contrast to models of alliance and group formation in the literature of economics of
con￿ ict and coalitional games of pillage, where group structures are shown to be symmetric.
Third, the game theoretic approach allows me to address questions concerning the
relative size and number of cliques, which could previously not be answered. A con￿ ict
technology, which is favorable for the node with a higher number of allies, permits cliques
to be of similar (yet di⁄erent) size, while a con￿ ict technology relatively favouring the node
with fewer allies, forces equilibrium con￿gurations into more asymmetric structures.
This paper is the ￿rst to incorporate friendly and antagonistic links in a game-theoretic
model of network formation and there are, of course, many open questions yet to be ad-
dressed. It appears natural to add a cost of linking and/or a cost to coercion. Introducing
incomplete or asymmetric information seems interesting, as outright con￿ ict may then arise
as part of an equilibrium. Furthermore, the so called trade-o⁄ between guns vs. butter of
the economics of con￿ ict literature is not part of the current speci￿cation and one could,
for example, allow for investment into production on the one hand and arming (the coercive
technology) on the other. A slightly di⁄erent model setup, where surplus is not generated
by the link, but a resource speci￿c to the agent, seems also promising.
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Lemma 1: In any NE g￿, @￿ gi;j = 0 for some i;j 2 N:
Proof. Assume there exist two nodes i and j such that ￿ gi;j = 0. To see that this can










Lemma 2: In any NE ￿ g￿; if 9i;j 2 N : ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1 with ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) < ￿
+
j (￿ g￿) then g￿
i;j = 1:
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1 with g￿
i;j = ￿1 and g￿
j;i = 1. But then i can
pro￿tably deviate with g￿
i + g
+
i;j, yielding ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 in the undirected network. This strictly






j (￿ g￿)+1)￿ for ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) < ￿
+
j (￿ g￿)




Proposition 1: 8￿ > 0 9NE g￿ : ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 8i;j 2 N:
Proof. A deviation for node i consists of extending negative links to some subset of Nnfig:
Denote the undirected network after a deviation with ￿ g￿0. If the deviation strategy of i
consists of extending a negative link to only one other node j, then payo⁄s remain the same,
as ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0) = ￿
+
j (￿ g￿0) = N ￿ 2 and i and j will continue to share the surplus of one in equal
parts. If the deviation strategy of i consists of extending two or more negative links, payo⁄s
will be strictly lower for i under the deviation, as then ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0) < ￿
+
k (￿ g￿0) 8k 2 Nnfig while
￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1 for some j 2 Nnfig.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2: 8￿ > 0 9NE ￿ g￿ : 9k : ￿ g￿
i;k = ￿1 8i 2 Nnfkg ^ ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 8i;j 2 Nnfkg:
Proof. Recall ￿rst from Lemma 1 that in any NE ￿ g￿; @s;t 2 N : ￿ g￿
s;t = 0. As above I
will check in the following for pro￿table deviations. Denote the undirected network after a
proposed deviation with ￿ g￿0. First, node k. From Lemma 2 I know that, as ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) < ￿
+
i (￿ g￿)
8i 2 Nnfkg, g￿
k;i = 1 8i 2 Nnfkg and a deviation of k therefore consists of extending
negative links to some subset of Nnfkg. To see that any such deviation decreases k￿ s payo⁄s
strictly, note that for ￿ g￿
k;i = ￿1 with g￿
k;i = 1, it must be that g￿
i;k = ￿1: If k were to
extend a negative link to i, the undirected link between k and i in ￿ g￿0 becomes ￿ g￿0
k;i = 0 and
payo⁄s for k are zero. Under ￿ g￿
k;i = ￿1, however, payo⁄s for k from its link to i are positive,
19while payo⁄s from nodes j 2 Nnfk;ig remain the same in both networks, ￿ g￿ and ￿ g￿0 (as
￿
+
k (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
k (￿ g￿0) = 0 and ￿
+
j (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
j (￿ g￿0) = N ￿ 2 8j 2 Nnfk;ig). Second, node i: There
are three types of possible deviations. First, i extends a positive link to k. But this decreases
i￿ s payo⁄s strictly as ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) < ￿
+
i (￿ g￿), while payo⁄s from all other links remain the same.
Second, i extends a negative link to some subset of Nnfk;ig. This deviation strictly decreases
payo⁄s: i￿ s payo⁄s will decrease from the link with k, as ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0) < ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) and will at most
yield constant payo⁄s from links with j 2 Nnfi;kg, by an argument analogous to Lemma 2.
Third, a combination of the above two deviations. Assume ￿rst i extends a positive link to
k and one negative link to some j 2 Nnfk;ig. i will not increase payo⁄s if n = 3; as then
￿
+
k (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
j (￿ g0) = 0 and will strictly decrease payo⁄s for n ￿ 4. To see this, note that then
￿
+
k (￿ g￿) = 0 while ￿
+
j (￿ g0) ￿ 1 8j 2 Nnfk;ig. Furthermore, for n ￿ 4, extending more than
one negative link to Nnfk;ig yields even lower payo⁄s than when linking negatively to only
one node in Nnfk;ig, again by the argument used in Lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: In any NE ￿ g￿, if ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
j (￿ g￿) =) ￿ g￿
i;j = 1
Proof. Assume there exists a Nash equilibrium strategy pro￿le g￿ : ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
j (￿ g￿) ^
￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1. I distinguish four cases.
Case 1: ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1 ^ ￿ g￿
i;k = ￿ g￿
j;k = ￿ g￿
k;l = 1 8k;l 2 Nnfi;jg:
This can not be a Nash Equilibrium, as 9k 2 N : ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) > ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) and k can pro￿tably
deviate with the following strategy g￿
k + g
￿
k;i: To see this, note ￿rst that ￿
+

















i (￿ g￿)+1)￿ > 1
2
and the inequality follows from ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) > ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) and ￿ > 0:
Case 2: ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1 ^ ￿ g￿
i;k = ￿ g￿
j;k = 1 8k 2 Nnfi;jg ^ 9￿ g￿
k;l = ￿1 for some k;l 2 Nnfi;jg:
Without loss of generality assume that g￿
i;j = ￿1 and g￿
j;i = 1: To see that this can not
be a Nash Equilibrium, note that if ￿ g￿
k;l = ￿1 for some k;l 2 Nnfi;jg, then ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) ￿
￿
+
l (￿ g￿) ￿ ￿
+






Denote the undirected network, resulting from the proposed deviation with ￿ g￿0: Note that
￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0), while ￿
+
k (￿ g￿0) = ￿
+















































Note that the only links that di⁄er in the undirected network ￿ g￿0, relative to ￿ g￿, are ￿ gi;j and











The inequality then holds from ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0), while ￿
+
k (￿ g￿0) = ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) ￿ 1:
Case 3: ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1 ^ N
￿
i (￿ g￿) 6= ; ^ N
￿
j (￿ g￿) 6= ;.
Without loss of generality assume below that g￿
i;j = ￿1 and g￿
j;i = 1: This can not be a Nash
equilibrium, as i can pro￿tably deviate with g￿
i + g
+
i;j: Denote again the undirected network
after the deviation with ￿ g￿0: Note that ￿
+
i (￿ g￿)+1 = ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0) and that N
￿
i (￿ g￿0) = N
￿
i (￿ g￿)nfjg:


























































i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
j (￿ g￿) and N
￿
i (￿ g￿0) = N
￿

















and the inequality simply follows from ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) + 1 = ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0) and ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) = ￿
+




21Case 4: ￿ g￿
k;l = ￿1 8k;l 2 N:
Without loss of generality assume below that g￿
i;j = ￿1 and g￿
j;i = 1: This can not be a




obtaining payo⁄s larger than 1
2 from all nodes k 2 Nnfi;jg.
Q:E:D:
Proposition 3: Any NE ￿ g￿ s:t: 9s;t 2 N : ￿+
s (￿ g￿) 6= ￿
+
t (￿ g￿), ￿ g￿ can be partitioned into
maximal cliques of di⁄erent size with ￿ g￿
i;j = ￿1; if i 2 Cm
k (￿ g￿) and j 2 Cm
l (￿ g￿):
The proof is by induction and requires several steps. First, rank the sets Pk(￿ g￿) by its
subscript and call the set with the highest subscript P m
k (￿ g￿) for some k 2 N+, the one with
the second highest subscript with P
m￿1
l (￿ g￿) for some l < k with l;k 2 N+: Proceed in this
way until the set with the lowest subscript. For ease of notation, I will drop the subscripts
in the following.
Base Case: In any NE ￿ g￿ : 9s;t 2 N : ￿+
s (￿ g) 6= ￿
+
t (￿ g); then ￿ gi;j = ￿1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿)^
8j = 2 P m(￿ g￿):
Step 1: I will ￿rst show that in any NE ￿ g￿ : 9s;t 2 N : ￿+
s (￿ g￿) 6= ￿
+
t (￿ g￿); N
+
i (￿ g￿)nfjg =
N
+
j (￿ g￿)nfig ^ N
￿
i (￿ g￿) = N
￿
j (￿ g￿) 8i;j 2 P m(￿ g￿):
For j P m(￿ g￿) j= 1; the statement holds trivially. Assume j P m(￿ g￿) j￿ 2, and - contrary
to the above - that 9i;j 2 P m(￿ g￿) : N
+
i (￿ g￿)nfjg 6= N
+
j (￿ g￿)nfig ^ N
￿
i (￿ g￿) 6= N
￿
j (￿ g￿): This
con￿guration, however, can not be a Nash equilibrium. To see this, take two nodes k and
l, such that k 2 N
+
i (￿ g￿)nfjg ^ k = 2 N
+
j (￿ g￿)nfig and l = 2 N
+
i (￿ g￿)nfjg ^ l 2 N
+
j (￿ g￿)nfig.
Note that under the above assumption such a pair of nodes k and l must always exist, as
otherwise ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) 6= ￿
+
j (￿ g￿). Without loss of generality, assume ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) ￿ ￿
+
l (￿ g￿): From
Lemma 2 I know that, in order for ￿ g￿ to be a Nash equilibrium, g￿
i;l = ￿1 while g￿
l;i = 1: But





i;k: Call the network
after the proposed deviation ￿ g￿0: This deviation is pro￿table for i, as ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0) but
￿
+
k (￿ g￿0) < ￿
+
l (￿ g￿), yielding strictly higher payo⁄s for i. I know now that N
+
i (￿ g￿)nfjg =
N
+
j (￿ g￿)nfig ^ N
￿
i (￿ g￿) = N
￿
j (￿ g￿) holds 8i;j 2 P m(￿ g￿):
Step 2: I will next show that any con￿guration ￿ g : 9s;t 2 N : ￿+
s (￿ g) 6= ￿
+
t (￿ g), which is not
one of the following two types, can not be a Nash equilibrium ￿ g￿. First, ￿ gi;k = 1 8i 2 P m(￿ g),
8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g): Second, ￿ gi;k = ￿1 8i 2 P m(￿ g), 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g):
Assume the contrary (and in accordance with Step 1) that 9k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) : ￿ g￿
k;i = 1
8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and 9l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) : ￿ g￿
l;i = ￿1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿). I distinguish two cases. First,
22@P m￿2(￿ g￿): Then the contradiction is immediate, as ￿ g￿
k;l = 1 8k;l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) while ￿ g￿
k;i = 1
8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and ￿ g￿
l;i = ￿1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) yields ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) 6= ￿
+
l (￿ g￿) and either k = 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) or
l = 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿), resulting in a contradiction. Second, assume 9P m￿2(￿ g￿) and 9k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) :
￿ g￿
k;i = 1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and 9l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) : ￿ g￿
l;i = ￿1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿): Note that for node
k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿), ￿ g￿
k;l = 1 8l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿)nfkg ^ ￿ g￿
k;i = 1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); while for node i 2
P m(￿ g￿); 9l 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) : ￿ g￿
i;l = ￿1^ ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 8j 2 P m(￿ g￿)nfig: Therefore, in order for
￿
+
i (￿ g￿) > ￿
+
k (￿ g￿); there must exist a node h 2 P m￿x(￿ g￿) with x ￿ 2, such that ￿ g￿
i;h = 1: This,






i;h: Denote again the network after the proposed deviation by ￿ g￿0: The
deviation is pro￿table for node i, as ￿
+
i (￿ g￿) = ￿
+
i (￿ g￿0), but ￿
+
h(￿ g￿0) < ￿
+
l (￿ g￿) (and it is also
pro￿table for node l, as ￿
+
l (￿ g￿) < ￿
+
i (￿ g￿), which is relevant for the Bilateral Equilibrium
case): I have so far shown that 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); either ￿ g￿
i;k = 1 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿); or ￿ g￿
i;k = ￿1
8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿):
Step 3: In any NE ￿ g￿ : 9s;t 2 N : ￿+
s (￿ g) 6= ￿
+
t (￿ g) and ￿ g￿
i;k = 1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); 8k 2
P m￿1(￿ g￿); then N
+
k (￿ g￿)nfig ￿ N
+
i (￿ g￿)nfkg 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) (and, con-
versely, N
￿
k (￿ g￿) ￿ N
￿
i (￿ g￿)).
First, note that there must 9h = 2 fP m(￿ g￿);P m￿1(￿ g￿)g : ￿ g￿
i;h = 1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) ^ ￿ g￿
h;k = ￿1
for some k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿): For, otherwise, ￿
+
k (￿ g) ￿ ￿
+
i (￿ g); contradicting the initial assumption
that i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿). Assume now that N
+
k (￿ g)nfig ￿ N
+
i (￿ g)nfkg does not
hold. Then there must 9l 2 N : ￿ g￿
i;l = ￿1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) ^ ￿ g￿
k;l = 1 for some k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿):
This, however, can not be a NE. Assume ￿
+
h(￿ g) ￿ ￿
+
l (￿ g): Then, a pro￿table deviation exists







l (￿ g) ￿ ￿
+






k;l. Both cases yield a contradiction.
Before proceeding to Step 4, I will de￿ne some further sets, which will prove to be useful.
De￿nition 2: De￿ne the following set(s) ~ Nm(￿ g￿) = fk 2 N j N
+
i (￿ g￿) \ N
￿
j (￿ g￿) with i 2
P m(￿ g￿) and j 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿)g and ~ Nm￿1(￿ g￿) = fk 2 N j N
+
i (￿ g￿) \ N
￿
j (￿ g￿) with i 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿)
and j 2 P m￿2(￿ g￿)g. Proceed in this way until the two sets P(￿ g￿) with the lowest number of
allies.
Step 4: I am now in the position to show that in any NE ￿ g￿ : 9s;t 2 N : ￿+




i;k = ￿1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿):
If @P m￿2(￿ g￿), the statement must hold, as otherwise ￿
+
i (￿ g) = ￿
+
k (￿ g). Assume now 9P m￿2(￿ g￿)
and contrary to the above statement, but in accordance with the statement in Step 2, that
23￿ g￿
i;k = 1 for 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿): I discern two cases. First, ￿k(g￿) ￿ ￿i(g￿) for





￿i) for 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿):
First note that by Step 3, if ￿ g￿
i;k = 1 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) then the following has to
hold N
+
k (￿ g)nfig ￿ N
+
i (￿ g)nfkg 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) (and, conversely, N
￿
i (￿ g￿) ￿
N
￿
k (￿ g￿)). Note that i 2 P m(￿ g￿) can then unilaterally imitate the strategy of k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) in
the following way: g￿
i +
P















any pair i 2 P m(￿ g￿); k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿). Note, however, that ￿i(g￿
i +
P




￿i) > ￿k(g￿) ￿























8h 2 ~ Nm(￿ g￿):
Case 2: ￿i(g￿) > ￿k(g￿), for i 2 P m(￿ g￿); k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿):
From Lemma 2 - together with ￿
+
h(￿ g￿) < ￿
+
k (￿ g￿) 8h 2 ~ Nm(￿ g￿); 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) - I know that
g￿
h;k = 1 while g￿
k;h = ￿1: Similarly to Case 1, node k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) can therefore unilaterally
imitate the strategy of i 2 P m(￿ g￿), such that ￿ g￿
h;k = 1 8h 2 ~ Nm(￿ g￿); 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿). Denote
again the undirected network after the deviation with ￿ g￿0. To see that ￿i(g￿) = ￿k(g￿0); note
that N
+
k (￿ g￿)nfig = N
+
i (￿ g￿0)nfkg 8i 2 P m(￿ g￿) and 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿) (and N
￿
i (￿ g￿) = N
￿
k (￿ g￿0)).
Therefore, k can pro￿tably deviate by extending friendly links to all nodes in ~ Nm(￿ g￿) and I
have reached a contradiction.
From the above it follows that in any NE ￿ g￿ : 9s;t 2 N : ￿+
s (￿ g￿) 6= ￿
+
t (￿ g￿); then g￿
i;j = ￿1
8i 2 P m(￿ g￿); 8k 2 P m￿1(￿ g￿): But then g￿
i;v = ￿1 8v = 2 P m(￿ g￿) and therefore j P m
x (￿ g￿) j=
x + 1:
De￿ne the set ~ P r(￿ g￿) = fP m(￿ g￿);P m￿1(￿ g￿);:::;P m￿r(￿ g￿)g. Note ~ P 0(￿ g￿) = P m(￿ g￿):
Inductive Step: In any NE ￿ g￿, if ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 8i;j 2 P m￿t(￿ g￿) ^ ￿ g￿
i;v = ￿1 8v = 2 P m￿t(￿ g￿)
holds 8t 2 N : 0 ￿ t ￿ r; then ￿ g￿
h;l = 1 8h;l 2 P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿) ^ ￿ g￿
h;w = ￿1 8w = 2 P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿):
In the base case I proved that ￿ g￿
i;j = 1 8i;j 2 P m(￿ g￿) ^ ￿ g￿
i;v = ￿1 8v = 2 P m(￿ g￿), i.e.,
that the ￿rst part of the statement holds for r = 0. To prove that this must hold 8Pk(￿ g￿);
k 2 N+; I assume the induction hypothesis holds for some r 2 N+ and then show that it
also holds for r + 1: Note ￿rst that, assuming the induction hypothesis holds, g￿
q;z = ￿1
8q 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿);8z = 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿): But then I also know that that in any Nash equilibrium g￿
z;q = 1
8q 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿);8z = 2 ~ P r(￿ g￿); as @￿ g￿
i;j = 0. I can therefore repeat steps 1 through 4 from the
24base step, relabeling P m(￿ g￿) with P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿) and P m￿1(￿ g￿) with P m￿(r+2)(￿ g￿) to establish
that g￿
h;l = 1 8h;l 2 P m￿(r+1)(￿ g￿); g￿
h;z = ￿1 8z 2 P m￿(r+2)(￿ g￿) and therefore ￿ g￿
h;w = ￿1
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